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NOTES
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. HILL:
PROTECTION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES
UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: The
United States Supreme Court upholds the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision construing the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
The Court holds that the Act prohibits completion of the Tellico
Dam since completion of the dam would jeopardize the continued
existence of the snail darter, an endangered species. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
On June 15, 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,' the much-publicized case in-
volving the multimillion dollar Tellico Dam, the snail darter, and
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.2 The decision is
significant in three fundamental respects. First, the decision provides
the long-awaited judicial interpretation of several key aspects of Sec-
tion 7.3 Second, the decision may prompt amendment of the Act,
thus posing the possibility that much of the judicial interpretation of
it to date could be rendered moot. Finally, the Supreme Court's
resolution of the Section 7 issue invites consideration of the broader
question: to what extent is the federal government willing to commit
itself to the protection of vanishing species? This note considers
these aspects of the decision. Also, as background to this considera-
tion, the mandate of the Act in general, and that of Section 7 in
particular, is discussed.
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND SECTION 7
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 presents a broad endangered
species preservation mandate to the entire federal government, not
merely to those federal agencies traditionally associated with wildlife
management. The policy statement of the Act provides that "all
Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this Act." 4 This affirmative mandate
1. 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
2. 16 U.S.C. § §1531-1543 (1973).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973).
4. 16 U.S.C. §1531(c) (1973).
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is buttressed by the unqualified definition of "conserve": "to use all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endan-
gered or threatened species to the point at which measures provided
pursuant to this act are no longer necessary." ' The substantive basis
for insuring that this mandate is carried out is provided by Section 7.
Section 7, the section of the Act that deals specifically with inter-
agency cooperation, is perhaps the most controversial and potentially
far-reaching section of the Act. It states:
All federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation with, and
with the assistance of the Secretary . . . (take) such action necessary
to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do
not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered and
threatened species, or result in the destruction or modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with the affected states, to be critical.6
The significant aspects of this section are that (1) no provisions exist
for balancing of factors: federal actions cannot destroy or modify
critical habitat or jeopardize the continued existence of a species; (2)
all federal agencies shall consult with the Secretary7 regarding the
effect of their activities upon critical habitat; and (3) the Secretary is
responsible for the all-important designation of critical habitat.'
These aspects of the section have resulted in its being labeled "non-
discretionary" by some. Indeed, the strict language of the section
might lead to this conclusion. The Secretary is to designate critical
habitat; the action-taking agency cannot destroy or modify critical
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (1973)
6. 16 U.S.C. §1536 (1973).
7. The Office of Endangered Species in the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department
of the Interior is responsible for the consultation process regarding land-dwelling species.
The National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of Commerce administers the
consultation process for marine species. Throughout this note, rather than refer specifically
to the relevant endangered species offices in both the Department of the Interior and the
Department of Commerce, we use the term Secretary (as does the Act itself) unless more
specific usage is needed. 16 U.S.C. §1532(10) (1973).
8. The Act does not define "critical habitat"; however, the Secretary of the Interior has
construed the term:
Critical habitat means any air, land, or water area (exclusive of those existing
manmade structures or settlements which are not necessary to the survival or
recovery of a listed species) and constituent elements thereof, the loss of
which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery
of a listed species or a distinct segment of its population. The constituent
elements of critical habitat include, but are not limited to: physical structures
and topography, biota, climate, human activity, and the quality and chemical
content of land, water and air. Critical habitat may represent any portion of
the present habitat of a listed species and may include additional areas for
reasonable population expansion. 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978) (to be codified as
50 C.F.R. §402.02).
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habitat; and the action-taking agency must consult with the Secre-
tary to insure that its projects will not destroy or modify critical
habitat. In certain circumstances Section 7, in fact, leaves very little
discretion in the action-taking agency. Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill provides a classic example of such a situation. However, to
appreciate the context of Tennessee Valley Authority, it is helpful to
first consider the circumstances in which substantial discretion may
be left with the action-taking agency.
Although Section 7 requires that critical habitat not be destroyed
or modified and provides for an interagency consultation process to
insure that it is not, the final decision as to whether a project will
modify critical habitat is left with the action-taking agency. The
consultation process is implemented pursuant to Guidelines on Inter-
agency Cooperation, which provide primarily procedural guidance.9
They require that each federal agency consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior.1 0 After consulta-
tion, the Service is to issue an opinion regarding the effect of the
project on critical habit.1 ' Procedural guideposts for the process are
presented by the guidelines. Yet, the substantive basis upon which a
decision as to any given project is to be made is not provided by the
guidelines and probably cannot be provided. Consequently, Section 7
can potentially leave much discretion in the action-taking agency.
When the opinions of Fish and Wildlife Service and the action-taking
agency differ, the fundamental consideration is not whether consul-
tation is mandatory, or whether the language of Section 7 states that
agencies "shall not" modify or destroy critical habitat. The impor-
tant consideration is, rather, who makes the final decision as to
whether a given action will jeopardize the continued existence of a
species or will destroy or modify critical habitat. That decision is
made by the action-taking agency. Since, under the guidelines, it is
the perogative of the Fish and Wildlife Service only to advise, an
agency may well decide to proceed with a project against the recom-
mendation of the Fish and Wildlife Service. If an agency so decides,
the ultimate resolution of the conflict may be in the judicial process.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. HILL
Under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act,
anyone may sue to (1) enjoin any violator of the Act (including the
action-taking agencies of the U.S. Government) or (2) compel the
9. 43 Fed. Reg. 870 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. §402).
10. 43 Fed. Reg. 875 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. §402.04).
11. 43 Fed. Reg. 875-876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. §402.04).
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administering agencies to enforce the prohibitions of the Act or tc
take certain actions pursuant to administrative authority.' I The pro-
vision regarding the second type of suit limits the otherwise broad
discretion of the Secretary. Challenge to the discretion of the Secre-
tary under this provision provides substantial potential for suit undei
the Act, but the most noted type of suit is that listed first above-suits
challenging the discretion of action-taking agencies in their project
decisions regarding destruction or modification of critical habitat.
Any action taken by any federal agency that under Section 7.
might jeopardize the continued existence of a species or contribute
to the destruction of critical habitat may be subject to suit. We have
alluded to suit as a means of resolving a dispute involving conflictinE
opinions of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the action-taking agen-
cies. Such suits involve the questions of what judicial deference is tc
be given a Fish and Wildlife opinion and whether critical habitat will
be destroyed or modified.' 3 Although these questions are quite
significant in the overall interpretation of Section 7, they are not
raised by Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, and they are not ana-
lyzed in this note. In Tennessee Valley Authority, the question is not
whether critical habitat will be destroyed or modified if the project
were completed; all parties agree that it would." 4 The question is
whether other considerations justify the potential destruction or
modification of critical habitat.
In Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Association of South-
eastern Biologists and certain other parties sought to enjoin the com-
pletion of the Tellico Dam and impoundment of the Little Tennessee
River pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. After much of the
dam had been completed, a species of fish, the snail darter, was
discovered in the Little Tennessee. The snail darter is a small,
tannish-colored fish which feeds on snails and thrives in the stretch
of the river that would be impounded by the dam. This stretch is the
only known habitat in the world where the darter exists naturally.' s
Consequently, the snail darter was listed as an endangered species.' 6
The snail darter requires high levels of oxygen in the waters it in-
habits and derives the necessary oxygen from the flowing waters of
the Little Tennessee. It also requires a gravel substrate, like that
found on the bottom of the Little Tennessee, to reproduce. The
12. 16 U.S.C. §1533(g)(1) (1973).
13. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976); National Wildlife
Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976).
14. 98 S. Ct. 2290 (1978).
15. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505-47,506 (1975).
16. Id.
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impoundment of the river by the Tellico Dam would effectively
cease the oxygen-producing flow of the river and cause heavy silta-
tion of the gravel stream bed. Impoundment would also eliminate the
snail darter's primary food source; snail populations would most
likely not survive in the reservoir. It is clear the critical habitat of the
snail darter would be modified by the project.' ' For these reasons
the respondent sought to enjoin the project under Section 7 of the
Act.
The Eastern District Court of Tennessee heard the issues of
whether the project would jeopardize the continued existence of the
snail darter, and whether injunctive relief would be appropriate to
force compliance with the Act if it were found that the project
would jeopardize the species' survival.' 8 The court found that "the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that closure of the
Tellico Dam ... will result in the adverse modification, if not com-
plete destruction, of the snail darter's critical habitat."' 9 Yet,
despite this finding, the court denied injunctive relief.' 0
The court was obviously swayed by the fact that over $35 million
had already been spent on the project when the Endangered Species
Act was enacted:
The case must be viewed in the context of its particular facts and
circumstances. We go no further than to hold that the Act does not
operate in such a manner as to halt the completion of this particular
project. A far different situation would be presented if the project
were capable of reasonable modifications that would insure com-
pliance with the Act or if the project had not been underway for
nearly a decade.
If plaintiff's argument [that given the Courts' first finding it has
little discretion regarding the issuance of an injunction] were taken
to its logical extreme, the Act would require a court to halt im-
poundment of water behind a fully completed dam if an endangered
species were discovered in the river on the day before such impound-
ment was scheduled to take place. We cannot conceive Congress
intended that result.
2 1
Despite the court's conception of congressional intent, there is no
indication in the language of Section 7 that the degree of a project's
completion should be a relevant consideration once it is determined
that critical habitat will be adversely modified.
17. 98 S. Ct. 2290 (1978).
18. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
19. Id. at 760.
20. Id. at 763.
21. Id.
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In overruling the district court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized the seeming inappropriateness of the district court's
balancing of equities and consideration of project status:
Were we to deem the extent of project completion relevant in deter-
mining the coverage of the Act, we would effectively defeat respon-
sible review in those cases in which the alternatives are most sharply
drawn and the required analysis most complex. ... Courts are ill-
equipped to calculate how many dollars must be invested before the
value of a dam exceeds that of the endangered species. 22
The appeals court viewed its role conservatively, as a guardian of
"the status quo where endangered species are threatened, thereby
guaranteeing the legislative or executive branch sufficient opportu-
nity to grapple with the alternatives."' 2 3 Further, the court was not
persuaded by the argument that Congress did not intend the Act to
apply to this project because appropriations measures for the project
continued to be passed by Congress even after the darter was dis-
covered.2 4
The court recognized the good faith effort of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) to preserve the snail darter by transplanting popu-
lations into areas of river that would not be modified by the Tellico
Dam project and that appear to be suitable to the continued exis-
tence of the darter.2 s Yet, such a good faith effort does not per se
meet the requirements of the Act. The court recognized that as long
as the snail darter is listed as endangered by the Department of the
Interior, efforts by TVA to compensate for the destruction or modi-
fication of the snail darter's habitat should not have a bearing on the
court's decision: "Nowhere in the Act are courts authorized to over-
ride the Secretary by arbitrarily 'reading' species out of the endan-
gered list or by redefining the boundaries of existing critical habitats
on a case by case basis."' 2 6 TVA claimed that it had done everything
possible to save the snail darter, short of abandoning work on the
dam. Yet, abandoning work on the dam is not an unreasonable alter-
native under the Act. Rather, it seems to be the only means available
to "insure" the continued existence of the snail darter. The court
recognized that the abandonment of past expenditures in favor of an
endangered species is within the spirit of the Act. 2 7
The appeals court was sympathetic to the district court's recogni-
22. Hill P. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (1977).
23. Id. at 1071.
24. Id. at 1072.
25. Id. at 1074.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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tion of the equitable factors involved in the Tellico case, although it
noted the impropriety of the lower court's weighing of these factors
in reaching its decision.2 8 The court suggested that were it not for its
conception of the judicial function in strictly upholding the language
of the Act, the equitable considerations might have been persuasive:
... only Congress or the Secretary of the Interior can properly
exempt Tellico from compliance with the Act. The separation of
powers doctrine is too fundamental a thread in our constitutional
fabric for us to be tempted to preempt Congressional action in the
29name of equity or expediency ...
Later in the analysis, we discuss the possibility of legislative or
administrative action influencing not merely the Tellico Dam contro-
versy but the Act itself.
In its decision of June 15, 1978 the Supreme Court affirmed the
opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.3 0 Like the district
court and court of appeals, the Supreme Court began its analysis
with the premise that the completion of the Tellico Dam would
eradicate the snail darter population in the Little Tennessee or de-
stroy its critical habitat. Given this premise, the Court discussed two
issues. First, the Court asked whether TVA would be in violation of
the Act if the Tellico Dam were completed and operated as planned.
Second, the Court queries whether an injunction would be an appro-
priate remedy if indeed TVA's actions would violate the Act.3 1
The Court looked to the "ordinary meaning of the plain language"
of the statute to determine that completion and operation of the
dam would violate the Act:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms
were any plainer than those in §7 of the Endangered Species Act. Its
very words affirmatively command all federal agencies "to insure
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not
jeopardize the continued 'existence' of an endangered species or
'result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species' " (court's emphasis). This language admits no exception. 32
In affirming the court of appeals decision, the Supreme Court recog-
nized what the district court did not; the Act does not provide for
the balancing of benefits between dam and darter. Once a court
determines that an action would destroy critical habitat of an endan-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 96 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
31. Id. at 2290.
32. Id. at 2291.
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gered species, the action-taking agency would be in violation of the
Act if the project is completed. At this point, the Act is indeed
nondiscretionary. The past expenditures on the project or the bene-
fits foregone by its abandonment are not to be considered. In this
regard, the Court stated that "[i] t may seem curious to some that
the survival of a relatively small number of three inch fish among all
the countless millions of species extant would require the permanent
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has ex-
pended more than $100 million."3 3 Nonetheless, the Court con-
cluded that the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act
require precisely that result. It recognized that Congress viewed the
value of endangered species as "incalculable." I
It was argued by TVA that Congress did not intend the Act to
stop a project such as the Tellico Dam; millions had been spent on
the project before the snail darter was discovered and it was virtually
complete at the time the Supreme Court heard the case. The Court
looked to the legislative history as well as the words of the statute to
reject TVA's contention. The Court, in interpreting the legislative
history, concluded that the "plain intent of Congress in enacting this
statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."3"a Also, TVA argued once again that because
appropriation measures funding continued work on the Tellico Dam
passed subsequent to both the passage of the Act and discovery of
the snail darter, Congress intended that the project be allowed to
proceed in spite of the Act's provisions. The majority opinion was
not persuaded by TVA's arguments in this regard and held that "(t)o
find a repeal of the Endangered Species Act under these circum-
stances would surely do violence tothe 'cardinal rule ... that repeals
by implication are not favored.' "36 Since the claim for repeal rests
only with an appropriations act, the Court discerned all the more
reason to reject the TVA appropriation argument. Finally, the Court
rejected TVA's argument that there should be an exception to the
rule of implied repealers in circumstnaces, such as those of this case,
where appropriations committees expressly stated their understand-
ing that earlier legislation would not prohibit the proposed expendi-
ture on the dam.3 7
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2298.
35. Id. at 2297.
36. Id. at 2299.
37. It should be noted that the dissenting opinion, of Justices Powell and Blackmun,
relies on the "subsequent appropriations" argument as an important element of its con-
clusion that the Act should not be applied to the Tellico Dam project. 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2309.
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Having decided that completion and operation of the dam would
constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Act, the Court then con-
sidered whether an injunction would be the appropriate remedy. The
Court recognized that "a Federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not
mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of
the law,"'3 s yet it views its role conservatively in fashioning a
remedy. In granting an injunction the Court stated:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular
course consciously selected by Congress is to be put aside in the
process of interpreting the statute. Once the meaning of an enact-
ment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial
process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor
are we vested with the power of veto.
3 9
In so construing its function, the Court precluded judicially created
modification of or flexibility with regard to Section 7.
In sum, the Tennessee Valley Authority decision clarifies two
aspects of Section 7. First, it confirms that Section 7 does not allow
for balancing of considerations in deciding whether to proceed with
an action that will destroy or modify critical habitat or that will
jeopardize the continued existence of a species. Endangered species
are to be given undeniable priority over such action, regardless of the
seeming insignificance of the species or the significance of the pro-
ject. The stage of the project's completion or the appropriations of
Congress regarding the action should not provide justification for
continuing a project that will violate the Act. Second, just as a bal-
ancing of considerations cannot be used to justify proceeding with a
project that will jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered
species, so is it improper for the courts to balance the equities of a
case arising under Section 7 in fashioning a remedy to achieve a
result that it, as a court, considers to be fair. Congress has made the
determination that once a project is found to be in violation of the
Act, it should not proceed; flexibility in the statutory mandate will
come, if at all, not from the courts, but from the administrators of
the Act or Congress itself.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
As a result of the Tennessee Valley Authority decision a number
of amendments to the Act have been proposed. Indeed, this effect of
the decision may be its greatest significance. The general thrust of
38. Id. at 2301.
39. Id. at 2302.
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the amendments proposed is to lessen the rigidity of the Section 7
mandate. The means by which this general objective can be accom-
plished vary from use of the administrative process in providing for
more consideration of traditional factors in decision-making to strict
legislative or administrative exclusion of projects or species from the
Act's coverage.4 Whatever the form a potential amendment of the
Act may take, the process of modifying the Endangered Species Act
necessitates a reconsideration of national priorities with regard to
endangered species protection.
Although balancing of competing factors is contrary to the lan-
guage, legislative history, and policy of the Act, the value of such a
procedure should not be discarded. It represents what is perhaps a
pragmatic approach the problem. The provisions of the Endangered
Species Act notwithstanding, is it really a desirable allocation of
resources to halt construction of a dam that is virtually completed so
that the snail darter can continue to thrive in the waters of the Little
Tennessee?4' In the eyes of many it is not, and consequently, the
result of Tennessee Valley Authority casts a questioning shadow
upon the Act.
The Tellico Dam controversy highlights the extremes of the Act's
provisions. It involves a project, the planning and construction of
which is so far advanced that the project itself cannot be modified to
avoid destruction of critical habitat. It involves a species that, absent
its symbolic significance, has attracted little national concern; the
40. At the time this note goes to press, amendment of the Act seems likely. Because the
precise substance of the potential amendment cannot be predicted with accuracy, we discuss
the possible amendments in no greater detail than to mention the proposed legislation here.
The Senate has passed a bill (S 2899) that would provide funding for the Act through 1981.
The bill amends the Endangered Species Act of 1973 so that a seven-member cabinet-level
committee would be created to decide cases in which there exists irreconcilable conflict as
to whether a given project should be exempt from the Act. The House has not yet taken any
similar actions. Greater flexibility in the administrative consultation process may also
provide action-taking agencies with a greater range of potential alternatives than was
exercised by TVA prior to the Supreme Court decision. For example, the Department of the
Interior has recommended a conservation program pursuant to the consultation process with
the Corps of Engineers that would allow co-existence of the Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes
Dams and the endangered plant species, the Furbish lousewort (1978) 9 Envir. Rep. (BNA)
446-447.
41. The benefits lost by abandonment of the Telico Dam project may not be as substan-
tial as dam expenditures and stage of completion might indicate. Testifying before a House
subcommittee on June 23, 1978 TVA Chairman, S. David Freeman stated that "the real
waste of the taxpayers' money may be in flooding the land." (1978) 9 Envir. Rep. (BNA)
364. TVA's reevaluation of traditional cost benefit analysis used in the original planning of
the project may lead to the conclusion that the benefits produced by the dam may, in fact,
be minimal. The utility of the dam, of course, is not a relevant consideration under the
Court's reading of Section 7. Moreover, the fact that the actual benefits of the dam may not
be substantial should not minimize the significance of the Tennessee Valley Authority case
as an illustration of the potential for conflict under the Act.
[Vol. 18
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. HILL
snail darter hardly generates the wide-spread sympathy or enthusiasm
aroused for such "glamorous" species as the whooping crane, the
peregrin falcon, or the grizzly bear. It is a situation such as that
surrounding the Tennessee Valley Authority case that can precipitate
efforts to weaken the Act so that the traditional values that rank
dams above darters can govern once again. Through the Endangered
Species Act, Congress has determined the management priorities of
federal agencies with regard to endangered species. The wisdom of
this sweeping decision may be questioned not only for the result it
dictates in certain projects, but also for its restriction of administra-
tive authority of action-taking agencies to set priorities and make
decisions.
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that it was the
failure of traditional decision-making values to protect endangered
species adequately that led to passage of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973. Therefore, something more is needed than a mere grant of
authority to federal agencies to consider endangered species protec-
tion in decision-making. Traditional resource management perspec-
tives focus on benefit/cost analysis, utilitarian concepts of the
greatest good for the greatest number for the longest period of time,
and more recently, environmental protection considerations. The
worth of endangered species is not easily measured by such criteria.
To a degree, endangered species protection is contemplated by estab-
lished environmental protection considerations; when the species
diversity of an ecosystem is significantly reduced, as can occur with
the extinction of a key species, the dynamic balance of the eco-
system can be severely altered. Yet, the probability of causing sub-
stantial ecological harm by the elimination of certain endangered
species is at worst unknowable, and in many instances may be slight.
Absent some specific endangered species mandate, more visible
aspects of environmental protection or resource management may
consistently receive administrative priority over endangered species.
Consequently, even a general environmental protection mandate is
likely not sufficient to assure significant administrative progress in
endangered species protection.
The failure of the equation of traditional management objectives
to yield satisfactory protection of endangered species does not in-
dicate unworthiness of the endangered species protection objective.
Rather, it illustrates the fact that something more than traditional
management perspectives must be considered in the protective
efforts. Perhaps more than anything else, conservation of endangered
species is an ethical responsibility. Concern for protection of endan-
gered species can exist even if their extinction might not have severe
October 19781
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ecological or environmental consequences. It has been estimated that
during the past 150 years, the rate of extinction of mammals has
increased 55-fold, and the activities of man are the cause of this
increase.4 2 The sense of ethical responsibility elicited by this situa-
tion is fundamental to the effort to protect endangered species and
to the realization that there is something more that inspires the
protection of endangered species than their potential material benefit
to man. Because the particular bases for a general ethical standard
can and do vary, legislation that addresses a general ethical concern
may not be consistent with all these various bases for that concern.
Legislation or administrative action based upon ethical value prefer-
ences can be imprecise and prone to pleasing few in the effort to
please many.
Despite the fact that a fundamental philosophy of endangered
species conservation is to value species using indicia other than the
species' utility for man, and despite the ideological incompatibility
of benefit/cost and endangered species, it may be necessary in some
situations to allow a project to continue despite its potential modifi-
cation or destruction of critical habitat. The ethical considerations
that precipitate endangered species protection efforts may not
always require that these efforts be carried out to the exclusion of all
other interests. Just as certain other resource policies with scientific
or economic justifications may sometimes be altered by competing
factors, so it is that the ethical basis for endangered species conserva-
tion may not always be determinative of the endangered species
issue. The important consideration is that all components, including
the ethical component, of endangered species protection be recog-
nized as viable factors to be used in giving endangered species sub-
stantial priority, although not necessarily paramount priority, in
federal decisions.
LARRY AUSHERMAN
*Editor's Note-Passed on October 15, 1978, HR 14104 amends the Endangered Species
Act of 1973. The amendment establishes a seven-member interagency committee to review
disputed projects involving endangered species. The committee is to review the Supreme
Court decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. If the committee does not make a final
decision within 90 days, the Tellico Dam project would be exempted from the Act. The
interagency review committee may also review other controversial projects after initial
review by a three-member review board. The reviewing bodies are to balance economic
considerations against environmental goals in making their decisions. Consequently, the
"nondiscretionary" aspects of Section 7 are weakened substantially by the recent amend-
ment.
42. L. R. REGENSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF EXTINCTION (1975).
[Vol. 18
